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Prearrest Delay: Is Ross Still Boss?

The right to a speedy trial is within the scope of protection afforded by the
sixth amendment' and Rule 48(b)2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This protection has traditionally been limited to postarrest situations.' In the
1965 case of Ross v. United States,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia dismissed an indictment against a criminal defendant
because an unreasonable and prejudicial prearrest delay violated the fifth
amendment due process rights of the defendant. Although some groundwork
for such a startling decision had previously been laid by various federal courts
around the country 5 Ross was unprecedented. With the announcement of Ross,
U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. [Emphasis added].
2. FED. R. CRIM:. P. 48(b) provides:
Dismissal
I.

(b) By Court. If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a 'grand jury
or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district
court, or if there is unnecessary. delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may
dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.
3. Both the sixth amendment and FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) have been traditionally applied to
delays occurring after indictment, or to delays occurring between arrest and indictment. See, e.g.,
Kroll v. United States, 433 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1970); Estrella v. United States, 429 F.2d 397,
400 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Grayson, 416 F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1059 (1970); Benson v. United States, 402 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Feinberg, 383 F2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1967); Terlikowski v. United States, 379 F.2d 501, 505 (8th
Cir. 1967); Nickens v. United States, .323 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied. 379 U.S.
905 (1964); Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962);
Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959); Parker v. United States, 252 F.2d
680, 681 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 356 U.S. 964 (1958). There have been three basic arguments against
the inclusion of preprosecution delays within the scope of a right to speedy trial: (I) the statute
of limitations should be the exclusive control over preprosecution delays; (2) the "potential
defendant" is not yet an "accused" and therefore has not been restricted by any criminal sanctions
(i.e., deprivation of liberty, property, and dignity); (3) a handicap to law enforcement authorities
would ensue in their efforts to apprehend criminals. For an excellent discussion and rebuttal of
these arguments, see, 20 STAN. L. REv. 476, 490 (1968).
4. Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
5. Simmons v. United States, 338 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 983 (1965),
stated that a violation of due process could arise in a prearrest delay situation if it was prejudicial,
purposeful or oppressive, and caused by the deliberate act of the government. See also Nickens
v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 810 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hardy v. United States, 343 F.2d 233,
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the fifth amendment due process clause' now provided prearrest protection for
potential defendants against unreasonable and prejudicial delay in bringing
criminal charges, even though such charges were brought within the period
allowed by the applicable statute of limitations. 7
This article will explore the reasons for and the result of prearrest delay and,
after discussing the Ross precedent, will delineate the Ross-type cases in all
the federal circuits and thus hopefully establish a comprehensible trend.
Why PrearrestDelays?
When discussing prearrest delays, clarity demands that we classify the topic
under two general headings-undercover situations and nonundercover situations. The former category will encompass the vast majority of cases.'
The prime example of an undercover situation occurs in narcotics
investigatory procedures. It is common for a police undercover agent to make
a series of narcotics purchases from unsuspecting "dealers" in a given
geographical area. The undercover agent's effectiveness would be grossly
diminished if he had to issue a warrant for the arrest of a seller upon each
sales transaction. His undercover identity would be useless for further
investigation. In addition, because his cover had been "blown," any
simultaneous investigation of other offenders would have to be curtailed,
perhaps prematurely, before a charge could be made. And finally, by revealing
an agent's identity prematurely, that agent's well-being is placed in danger.
The narcotics undercover agent is unique in the field of police espionage
because he deals with the offenders in an abbreviated fashion, (i.e., a brief street
encounter with a quick exchange of money for narcotics) and he may buy from
a "dealer" on only one occasion. On the basis of that one contact, the officer
must establish sufficient evidence for a warrant: the date and place of the sale,
and a description of the seller. At the termination of his investigation, usually
months after most of the purchases have been made, the officer files charges
against all of the individuals who have sold narcotics to him. Unless there were
234 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965); Sanchez v. United States, 341 F.2d 225,
228 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 856 (1965); Wilson v. United States, 335 F.2d 982, 98486 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (dissenting opinion from denial of rehearing en banc); Taylor v. United States,
238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C. 1965).
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides: "No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; ...."
7. Ross and subsequent cases professed the principle that the statute of limitations merely
represented the "outer limits" of time within which formal charges could be brought. Due process
considerations should take precedence over this "outer limit" in dealing with prearrest delays.
8. Approximately 72 percent of the cases reviewed by this writer were found to be of the
narcotics-undercover type.
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other witnesses to the transactions, the government's cases rest solely on the
memory and "sketchy" notes of the undercover agent. In non-narcotics
undercover situations (e.g., infiltration of a so-called "radical" group such as
the Weathermen or Youth International People's Party) longer periods of
undercover work are called for. The agent must win the acceptance and
confidence of the group in order to be included in their "potentially criminal"
plans. When the agent feels that he has sufficient evidence to bring charges
against the group or certain individuals within it, he discards his undercover
role and prepares for the arrest and indictment. His true identity may also
have to surface at a time before the criminal act, e.g., a bombing has occurred,
in an effort to abort the group's planned endeavor. More than likely his notes
are voluminous in comparison with the narcotics agent's brief diary. In
addition, while the narcotics agent has a multitude of difficult identifications
and arrests to make, the undercover "radical" has no problem with identifying
the members of the group against whom charges will be brought. Also, since
the undercover agent's primary purpose is a preventative one, cases involving
such a "radical" group usually result in conspiracy charges against the
individuals. The argument is made that the elements of proof of a conspiracy
are not particularly stringent, 9 certainly they are less stringent than those the
narcotics agent must prove. The narcotics agent on the other hand has a fairly
difficult task. He has little face-to-face contact with "potential defendants",
and he encounters many more of these "potential defendants" than any other
type of undercover agent. He must be able to testify convincingly as to the
time and place of the transactions, and his notes and memory must be utilized
to positively identify the defendant and withstand any cross-examination
pressure from the defense.
The nonundercover situation of prearrest delays also breaks down into two
categories. The first occurs when lengthy investigation is necessary because of
the nature of the offense involved.10 Such lengthy investigation is required to
9. A conspiracy is defined as "a combination between two or more persons to accomplish a
criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means." R. PERKSIN,
CRIMINAL LAW 613 (2d ed. 1969). Proof of conspiracy requires showing of the nature of the
agreement, participation, the mental state of the conspirators, and an overt act taken toward

completion of the conspiracy. I

WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

171-221 (Ist

ed. 1957).
10. United States v. Halley, 431 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1970), a 17 month delay in prosecuting
a bank robber was held nonprejudicial and necessary for the investigatory processes; United States
v. Orsinger, 428 F.2d 1105, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1970), a five year delay in a prosecution for mail
fraud was held reasonable because of the extended investigation necessary into the complicated
affairs of the defendant and his corporations; United States v. Parrott, 425 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.
1970), investigation of the complex criminal deeds of defendants allowed for a three year delay
in a conspiracy to sell unregistered securities; United States v.Feldman, 425 F.2d 688 (3d Cir.
1970), investigation provided ample justification for a 42 month delay in prosecution for concealing
assets in a bankruptcy proceeding.
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insure against the false arrest of innocent people. The delay in this category
of cases is generally reasonable as part of the inherent difficulties in proving
a particular crime." The second category of nonundercover delay occurs when
the police have probable cause to arrest an individual but for one reason or
another fail to do so for a period of time. 12 If the police effort in these instances
was diligent and normal the courts have held that such delays were not
purposeful, i.e., intentional on the part of the law enforcement officials, and
therefore they were reasonable.
Effects of Delay-Prejudice
Prejudice from prearrest delays occurs in two ways. First it negatively affects
the defendant's ability to defend himself. This can occur due to a lapse of
memory on the part of the defendant. During the entire period of delay the
future defendant is unaware that he will eventually be called upon to answer
for his whereabouts and conduct on the specific date of the alleged offense.
Ordinarily, unless he has a stable frame of reference, i.e., steady employment,
he will be unable to attach any particular significance to the day or days in
question and thus will not be able to recall where he was or whom he saw.
Prearrest delay is especially acute in the case of narcotics offenders who may
easily be prejudiced by an inability to remember events which allegedly occurred
months before arrest and by an inability to obtain witnesses to verify an alibi
defense.' 3 Besides the problem of recalling his exact whereabouts, the accused's
defense could also suffer by the death or disappearance of witnesses who could
have testified on his behalf' 4 and establish an alibi defense or perhaps
1I. See cases cited in note 10 supra.
12. United States v. McCray, 433 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1970), a ten month delay after
offense of "larceny after trust" held not violative of defendant's due process rights because
defendant was aware that police were looking for him five days after the offense was committed.
United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1970), three and one-half month delay
after robbery and assault was held not violative of defendant's due process rights because of the
exigencies of the investigative and indictment processes and by defendant's enrollment in the Air
Force. But see Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968), in which the court remanded
the case for a determination of possible prejudice where defendant was arrested for a robbery seven
months after the victim had identified defendant from photographs. The delay was seemingly
inexplicable since defendant lived and worked in the immediate vicinity for the entire seven-month
period; United States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp. 585 (D. Alas. 1970), an eight month delay justified
reversal of conviction of unlawful possession of firearms where the nature of the crime required
no lengthy investigation and there was no other reason for delay.
13. In his dissent to Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1965), Judge Skelly
Wright stressed this very point concerning narcotics offenders: "The people in this subculture
simply do not have desk pads and social calendars to assist them in determining where they were
at a particular time many months before. They live from day to day and one day is very much
like another."
14. See United States v. Haulman, 288 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Mich. 1968); cf United States v.
Smalls, 438 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1971).
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substantiate a defense of entrapment. 5 The second situation resulting in
prejudice to the defendant affects identification procedures. This is especially
true in narcotics cases. As was previously discussed, the narcotics agent makes
numerous transactions in very similar circumstances and with many different
dealers. How can he be sure that the right man is in the defendant's chair? Is
it not likely that after a few months his memory of the brief encounter is clouded
as to the distinguishing characteristics of the narcotics dealer? In these cases
a court looks to how the identification by the agent was carried out. An
identification made during a face-to-face re-encounter under similar conditions
is considered more effective than one made as the agent sifts through a stack
of photographs of known narcotics addicts and offenders. The court will
naturally consider whether the identification was corroborated by other
witnesses to the transactions. If not, the agent's notebook must be carefully
scrutinized: How much does he rely on his notes? 6 How complete a description
of the defendant is contained in his notebook?' 7 How much experience does
the agent have?" And of course how long was the delay? 19
An Examination of Ross and Woody-Precedent Setters?
Ross v. United States was a narcotics delay case in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a balance must be
struck between the public interest served by undercover narcotics investigation
by the police, and the prejudice to the defendant stemming from the method
of investigation and the reasonableness of the police conduct. The court reversed
Ross' conviction and found: (1) a purposeful, i.e., intentional seven month
delay 20 by the police between the time of the alleged sale and the swearing out
of a warrant even though the defendant was continuously available for arrest
during the entire period; (2) that the appellant was a man of little intelligence, 2'
was employed irregularly, and was making a plausible claim of inability to
recall or reconstruct the day of the offense; and (3) that the undercover agent,
a rookie policeman, also showed the effects of the passage of time since he
admitted having no personal recollection of the incident and testified largely
while referring to his notes. 22 The officer's testimony was also uncorroborated
as to the identity of the defendant in one of many similar transactions over a
long period of time.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See United States v. Curry, 284 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
See Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See Woody v. United States, 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
See Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
ld. at 213.
Id. at 214.
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In Woody v. United States22 where the facts were similar to those in Ross, 4
Chief Judge Bazelon found that the police investigative methods resulted in
prejudice to the accused. He held that the police have a positive obligation to
minimize prejudice and increase their efforts to reduce the risk of erroneous
convictions. He further stated that "[R]isks are created where, for example,
the delay is unreasonably lengthy or wholly unnecessary, or where the police
have it within their power to enhance the reliability of their method of
identification without jeopardizing their undercover investigation, yet fail to
do so." - Both Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge McGowan, who concurred in
the reversal of the conviction, spoke in terms of distinguishing factors and
special circumstances which warranted reversal. For Bazelon, the failure of the
arresting officer to notice the two-inch facial scar on the appellant and the
clothing he (defendant) was wearing when the officer normally recorded such
characteristics in his contemporaneous notes, cast grave doubts as to the
effectiveness of the identification. 26 Judge McGowan stated that the delay of
four months was not so unreasonable as to warrant reversal absent special
circumstances. However, the death of one potential witness and the
unwillingness of another to testify, constituted "potential prejudice which goes
well beyond the usual protestation of inability to remember."21 The dissenting
opinion of Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger framed the issue rather clearly
as not being a question of whether or not there was prejudice to the defendant's
case, but simply whether the identification was adequate. Burger differed from
McGowan in his assessment of prejudice. He maintained that the application
of Ross to any specific case turns on three operative elements: (I) the length
of the purposeful delay; (2) the basis of identification; and (3) the effect of
the delay in rebutting the identification, i.e., the resulting prejudice. 8 "It is
the existence of a purposeful delay and a Ross-type identification that permits
a lesser degree of prejudice to reverse; without those factors, the narcotics
defendant would be required to show substantial and specific prejudice." 29 Thus
Burger felt that because the delay was of only four months, a greater showing
of prejudice had to be made, which prejudice was not sufficient in Woody to
require reversal. Burger felt that Woody's identification process was more
reliable than Ross'30 and that no great quantum of prejudice resulted from the
23. 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Note, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1361 (1967).
24. Actually, the alleged offense arose out of the same series of transactions as that in the
Ross case.
25. 370 F.2d at 216-7.
26. Id.at 217.
27. Id.at 219.
28. Id. at 220.
29. Id. at 220-21.
30. Id. at 221. The undercover agent identified Woody from photographs within a week to
ten days after the alleged offense.
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death of a "key" defense witness. Such prejudice is only speculative. 3'
1965-1971: Requiem for Ross and Woody?
In retrospect it seems that Judge Burger's dissent in Woody foreshadowed the
downfall of the due process argument with respect to prearrest delays. Since
1965, when Ross and Woody were decided, all the federal circuits have merely
paid lipservice to their holdings. There is a paucity of decisions in which a
reversal of a conviction has been granted on the grounds of unnecessary
prearrest delay3. 2 On the other hand there is a plethora of prearrest delay
decisions which have upheld convictions; these are distinguished from Ross and
Woody in five general ways: (1).the delay was of such a short duration as to
be considered reasonable; (2) the government had valid justification for the
delay; (3) the accused's defense was not prejudiced by the delay; (4) even if
prejudiced, the accused failed to raise the argument before the trial ended; (5)
the prearrest delay is controlled solely by the statute of limitations. One or
more of these distinctions was used by the federal courts in their efforts to
avoid a Ross-type result. For the sake of clarity, each of these points will be
discussed briefly.
The Delay
In Jackson v. United States" the court stated that the delay in arrest may be
so great that prejudice can be presumed unless the government can show
otherwise. However, no other federal court has expounded on the dictum in
31. Id. at 222. Even if Woody had been arraigned the very day of the offense the witness would
not have been able to testify at his trial since she died 3 h months later. Woody's case had not
reached the trial stage by that time.
32. Jones v. United States, 402 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court had difficulty in
ascertaining the justification for a seven month delay in a robbery case. Defendant lived at his
mother's house and worked a few blocks from the situs of the crime for the entire seven month
period. The court remanded the case with instructions for the district court to determine what
prejudice had evolved, and what if any justification there was for the delay. Godfrey v. United
States, 358 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court divided the four month delay into two periods.
The first two months were reasonable because of the undercover agent's retention of his undercover
role, but once the government issued the arrest warrant the last two months proved prejudicial
with no justification. United States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp. 585 (D. Alas. 1970), the court held
that there was no explanation for an eight month delay. There was no complicated investigation
required for an unlawful possession of firearms charge. Defendant had shown prejudice by his
lapse of memory and loss of a witness. United States v. Haulman, 288 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Mich.
1968), the court held that a two year delay from the time when the government had sufficient
evidence to prosecute a federal banking violation was sufficiently prejudicial in that six witnesses
had died within that span. United States v. Curry, 284 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Ill. 1968), narcotics
offenses and arrest was prejudicial because the defendant could not locate the undercover agent
for purposes of an entrapment defense.
33. 351 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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Jackson and thus there has been no formula derived as to the exact point of
time prejudice can be presumed. Rather, in Worthy v. United States" the court
stated that a four month delay did not even require inquiry into the
reasonableness of the police purpose for such a delay. The four months were
simply accepted as justifiable. However, soon after Worthy, the Woody decision
was handed down5 in which the court did inquire into the reasonableness of
a four month delay. In many cases the courts have merely based their decision
on the premise that the delay was insignificant and therefore reasonable. 3
Justificationfor Delay
Even if there is a delay between offense and arrest, the government may have
valid reasons for it. In narcotics cases the justification for delay lies in the
protection and further use of the investigatory agent by withholding his identity
for a period of months. In nonnarcotics cases the delay may be justified by
the necessity of lengthy investigation or difficulty in locating the defendant. 7
Resulting Prejudice
Even if there is delay without valid justification the defendant must still make
a showing of prejudice. This may take the form of prejudice to his defense in
that his memory has faded concerning his whereabouts on the date of the alleged
offense, or in that a defense witness has died or is unobtainable at the time of
trial. Prejudice may also be manifested by identification problems. However,
many courts have sidestepped this issue by considering corroborated testimony,
34. 352 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
35. 370 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
36. D.C. Circuit: King v. United States, 369 F.2d 213 (1966) (seven months); Daniels v. United
States, 357 F.2d 587 (1966) (eight weeks); Bey v. United States, 350 F.2d 467 (1965) (3 / months).
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Escobedo, 430 F.2d 603 (1970) (two weeks). Ninth Circuit: Jordan
v. United States, 416 F.2d 338 (1969) (three months). Tenth Circuit: United States v. Kellerman,
432 F.2d 371 (1970) (two weeks); Acree v. United States, 418 F.2d 427 (1969) (four months).
37. D.C. Circuit: United States v. McCray, 433 F.2d 1173 (1970) (diligent effort by police
to locate defendant for ten months); United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146 (1970) (investigation
and location of defendant held justification for delay); United States v. Orsinger, 428 F.2d 1105
(1970) (complicated investigation for mail fraud); Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705 (1965)
(intent to protect identity of undercover agent); Bey v. United States, 350 F.2d 467 (1965) (protect
identity of undercover agent). Second Circuit: U.S. ex. rel. Robinson v. Deegan, 315 F. Supp.
324 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (unintentional delay of ive months in narcotics case.). Third Circuit: United
States v. Morris, 308 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D. P.A. 1970) (delay to gather more evidence against a
narcotics ring). Seventh Circuit: United States v. Napue, 401 F.2d 107 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1024 (1969) (to protect undercover agent); United States v. Panczko, 367 F.2d 737 (1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (prosecution preparation for counterfeiting case), Ninth Circuit:
United States v. Snyder, 429 F.2d 1242 (1970) (protect key witness); Whitted v. United States,
411 F.2d 107 (1969) (gather more evidence against other violators); Wilson v. United States, 409
F.2d 184, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 983 (1969) (protect identification and use of undercover agent).
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the experience and reliability of the undercover agent, and the fact that the
evidence may be documentary as factors lessening the prejudice to the defendant." s
Waiver
If the defendant does not raise the issue of a due process violation caused by
delay at least by the end of his trial, he will be barred from raising it on appeal
or attacking it collaterally. 9
Statute of Limitations
Some jurisdictions have utilized the statute of limitations to dodge the due
process argument. They have held that the only protection afforded a potential
38. D.C. Circuit: United States v. Moss, 438 F.2d 147 (1970) (defendant could recall all
relevant events); Dancy v. United States, 395 F.2d 636 (1968) (no prejudice because there were
witnesses to the transactions and no identification problems); Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d
277 (1967) (no identification problem, defendant had steady employment to serve as a frame of
reference for recall); Worthy v. United States, 352 F.2d 718 (1965) (no identification problem);
Powell v. United States, 352 F.2d 705 (1965) (defendant testified in considerable detail). First Circuit: United States v. Frost, 431 F.2d 149 (1970) (defendant had reason to remember offense and
suffered no memory lapse). Second Circuit: United States v. Smalls, 438 F.2d 711 (1971) (witnesses were available); United States v. Parrott, 425 F.2d 972 (1970) (documentary evidence); United
States v. Feinberg, 383 F.2d 60 (1967) (defendant was on notice that police were investigating one
week after the offense). Third Circuit: United States v. Feldman, 425 F.2d 688 (1970) (defendant
had notice of investigation one month after offense); United States v. Childs, 415 F.2d 535 (1969)
(no identification problem since witness was a lifelong friend of defendant). Fourth Circuit: United
States v. Baker, 424 F.2d 968 (1970) (agent had a number of contacts with defendant, thus no
identification difficulty). Fifth Circuit: Holsen v. United States, 392 F.2d 292 (1968) (defendant
failed to show prejudice in narcotics case where there was a delay of nine months). Seventh Circuit:
United States v. Lee, 413 F.2d 910 (1968); United States v. Milstein, 401 F.2d 51 (1968) (defendant showed no loss of memory); United States v. Deloney, 389 F.2d 324 (1968) (defendants failed
to show prejudice to their ability to defend). Eighth Circuit: United States v. Golden, 436 F.2d 941
(1971) (general inability to recall held not to be prejudice); United States v. Peterson, 302 F. Supp.
1232 (D. Minn. 1969) (corroborated testimony prevented identification prejudice). Ninth Circuit:
Estrella v. United States, 429 F.2d 397 (1970) (defendant showed no memory loss by his specific
testimony); United States v. Stanley, 422 F.2d 826 (1969) (no identification problem); United States
v. Erickson, 325 F. Supp. 712 (D. Alas. 1971) (defendant knew that he was suspect in bank robbery
only four months after offense).
39. D.C. Circuit: Hardy v. United States, 381 F.2d 941 (1967) (cannot raise issue collaterally).
The remainder of the cases cited in this footnote all held that a reversal of conviction would not
be proper because the defendant failed to raise the issue of due process violation by the end of
trial. D.C. Circuit: Roy v. United States, 356 F.2d 785 (1965); Jackson v. United States, 351
F.2d 821 (1965). Second Circuit: United States v. Smalls, 438 F.2d 711 (1971); United States v.
Parrott, 425 F.2d 972 (1970); United States v. Henry, 417 F.2d 267 (1969); Chapman v. United
States, 376 F.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Sanchez, 361 F.2d 824 (1966). Fourth Circuit: United
States v. Harbin, 377 F.2d 78 (1967). Seventh Circuit: United States v. Kotakes, 440 F.2d 342
(1971). Ninth Circuit: Estrella v. United States, 429 F.2d 397 (1970); Benson v. United States,
402 F.2d 576 (1968); United States v. Erickson, 325 F. Supp. 712 (D. Alas. 1971).
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defendant against stale prosecution lies in the application of the statute of limitations. Some jurisdictions have followed this traditional approach but have
allowed for an exception if the defendant can exhibit prejudice and an unreasonable delay. °
Conclusions and Recommendations:
Since the federal circuits have not adhered to the rationale of Ross, and since
the Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on this due process issue.' the central
issue of prearrest delay is still unanswered. The fact of the matter is that a
delay of some months does present a real problem to certain defendants,
especially in narcotics cases. The narcotics offender has no reason to believe
that the police have focused their suspicion on him and therefore, any alibi
defense is usually prejudiced by lack of memory. Concededly, it is impractical
to arrest every narcotics offender immediately. Some delay is necessary
[b]ecause there are no other ways of doing these things. But the
police testimony was that, in planning and managing these
undercover operations no account whatsoever was taken of a
defendant's interest in being appraised quickly of what he is charged
with having done. We will never know whether or not these
operations can, with no serious impairment of the public interest,
be differently arranged until their planning has at least taken this
factor into account. We have heretofore recognized that some
adverse impact upon this interest of the accused is inseparable from
the undercover approach, and that a not inconsiderable period of
delay may be justifiable in the balancing of public and private
interests."
The danger of prejudice due to misidentification can be lessened to a degree
by the use of multiple transactions with the one person, and by different
undercover agents if necessary. Corroboration would then be present in all
40. The following cases all held that the applicable statute of limitations should be the sole
protection for the potential accused. First Circuit: Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735 (1967).
Second Circuit: United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821 (1968). Fifth Circuit: Kroll v. United
States, 433 F.2d 1282 (1970); Whatley v. United States, 428 F.2d 806 (1970); McConnell v. United
States, 402 F.2d 852 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 933 (1969). Sixth Circuit: Lothridge v. United
States, 441 F.2d 919 (1971); United States v. Harris, 412 F.2d 471 (1969); Hoopengarner v.
United States, 270 F.2d 465 (1959). Ninth Circuit: United States v. Halley, 431 F.2d 1180 (1970).
41. See Justice Brennan's discussion of the relevant issues in prearrest delay in Dickey v.
Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 43-47 (1969) (concurring opinion); In United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116
(1966), the court held that the statute of limitations is "usually considered the primary guarantee
against bringing overly stale criminal'charges." Id. at 122; and in Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966), the court said that "there is no constitutional right to be arrested." Id. at 310
(dictum).
42. Lee v. United States, 368 F.2d 834, 835 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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cases. If there is difficulty in obtaining corroboration of identity, a system
should be instituted whereby one agent makes more buys from fewer "dealers."
The agent would then have fewer potential defendants to remember and would
have a clearer picture in his mind of those with whom he had dealt on more
than one occasion. Also it might be practical to have the narcotics agent surface
and make the arrests personally in a shorter period of time. This would require
a larger staff of undercover agents, but perhaps a revolving assignment schedule
to different geographical areas could be adopted by the police administration.43
Finally, "the documentary record" on identification could be improved, since
it appears to consist at the moment of random and unsystematic note-taking
by individual officers. A standard form, with a check list of identification
features and other details, and designed to serve as a continuing file on the
defendant in which all observations are to be entered, would appear to be worth
44
consideration.
A statutory scheme outlining a time limit within which an accused must
be arrested and brought to trial may also be a solution. However, to avoid
unwanted litigation in our overcrowded court system, issues such as reasonableness and justification of the delay, resulting prejudice, will somehow have to be
kept to a minimum. Those issues, though necessarily decisive in determining
whether there has been a statutory violation, can be reduced to that minimum
by establishing in the statute an upper and lower cut-off point for prearrest
delay. For example, a defendant could not raise the issue of prearrest delay if
the delay was not at least four months; the government, however, would face a
presumption of prejudice with a delay of over eight months. Therefore, in a
situation where the delay is less than four months the issue cannot be raised. If
it is over eight months there would only be one issue to decide, i.e., whether the
government had valid justification for the delay in order to overcome the
presumed prejudice to the defendant. The entire range of issues would be dealt
with only when the delay was four to eight months.
Ross v. United States presented a sound constitutional doctrine for the
protection of potential defendants. The Ross rationale was a guarantee of
fairness to an accused when injustice arose from an avoidable and unreasonable
delay by the government. Since our legal system takes great pains to protect
the innocent until they are proven guilty, it would seem that instead of being
overlooked and distinguished by our courts, Ross should be further developed
into a well-organized constitutional protection for the accused in order to prevent serious prejudice to their defense.
Cary S. Griffin
43. Undercover narcotics operations resulting in delays of less than four months have been
quite successful in New York City. Note, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 638, 644 (1966).
44. Dancy v. United States, 395 F.2d 636, 639 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

